Interactions between Price and Price Deal by Swani, Kunal & Yoo, Boonghee
Wright State University 
CORE Scholar 
Marketing Faculty Publications Marketing 
11-12-2009 
Interactions between Price and Price Deal 
Kunal Swani 
Wright State University - Main Campus, kunal.swani@wright.edu 
Boonghee Yoo 
Follow this and additional works at: https://corescholar.libraries.wright.edu/marketing 
 Part of the Advertising and Promotion Management Commons, and the Marketing Commons 
Repository Citation 
Swani, K., & Yoo, B. (2009). Interactions between Price and Price Deal. Journal of Product & Brand 
Management, 19 (2). 
https://corescholar.libraries.wright.edu/marketing/29 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Marketing at CORE Scholar. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Marketing Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of CORE Scholar. For more information, 
please contact library-corescholar@wright.edu. 
1 
 
The Original Manuscript Submitted on June 7, 2009  
The Revised Manuscript Submitted on October 13, 2009  
The Final Manuscript Submitted on November 12, 2009 
To Dr. Hooman Estelami, Associate Editor (estelami@fordham.edu) 
 Journal of Product & Brand Management 
 
 




Lencore Acoustics Corp.  
E-mail: swanikunal@gmail.com 






Department of Marketing and International Business 
Frank G. Zarb School of Business  
Hofstra University 
E-mail: mktbzy@hofstra.edu 




Associate Professor  
131 Weller Hall 
Department of Marketing and International Business 
Frank G. Zarb School of Business  
Hofstra University 
Hempstead, New York 11549  
Phone: (516) 463-4242 





Manuscript as of November 12, 2009 
 
 
Swani, Kunal and Boonghee Yoo (2010), “Interactions between Price and Price Deal,”  
Journal of Product and Brand Management, 19 (2), 143-152.
2 
 
Interactions between Price and Price Deal 
 
Purpose:  The purpose of this study was to examine the interactive 
effect of price and price deal. Specifically, we wanted to 
measure how consumers’ behavioral intentions toward the 
brand are affected for a high-priced brand and a low-priced 
brand when a price deal is offered. 
Design/methodology/approach: A two (price level: high versus low; between) by two (price 
deal: absent versus 40% off; between) experimental design 
was used. Study 1 tested the hypotheses for two existing 
brands whereas Study 2 did so for a fictitious brand. 
Findings:  The analysis confirmed a strong interactive effect between 
price and price deal: price deals do not have a uniform effect 
across brands but a different effect depending on the price 
level of the brand. Specifically, for a high-priced brand, we 
found a negative effect of price deals on behavioral 
intentions (brand equity, brand loyalty, and purchase 
intention). On the contrary, for a low-priced brand, we found 
a positive effect of price deals on each of the same behavioral 
intention variables.  
Research limitations/implications: Future research needs to study different types of products and 
samples to enhance the external validity of the findings. Real 
market data that recorded price changes and price deal 
offerings over time need to be examined to confirm the 
findings of the study.  
Practical implications: A managerial implication is that high-priced brands should 
avoid price deals whereas low-priced brands could benefit 
from price deals.  
Social implications: When the findings are extended to the public-sector or 
governmental services, providing costly services at a 
discounted price (e.g., universal healthcare) may not be 
welcome as that policy is likely to make fellow citizens 
underestimate the value of the services and doubt the quality. 
Originality/value: This study is very original because it does not repeat any past 
research, but taps into a problem not previously investigated. 
The value of the study is very straightforward to brand and 
promotional managers.  
Keywords:  Price, price deal, brand equity, brand loyalty, purchase 
intention, luxury brand, and interaction. 
Classification: Research paper 
3 
 
Interactions between Price and Price Deal 
 Many studies found a negative effect of price deals and a positive effect of price on 
consumers’ behavioral intentions, but little research has examined the interactive effect of price 
and price deals. Consequently it would be very important to study how price and price deals 
interact to affect behavioral intentions. The result will provide insight into how to use price 
deals. Thee purpose of this research is to develop and test a conceptual model of the interactive 
effect between price and price deals on behavioral intentions, which are measured in brand 
equity, brand loyalty, and purchase intention.  
Price Deals versus Price 
 Price deals are found to negatively affect behavioral intentions (Aaker 1991; Yoo, 
Donthu, and Lee 2000). For example, Grewal et al. (1998) and Chen et al. (1998) report that 
price deals, while often generating traffic in a retail store, cause consumers to discount the 
perceived quality and the internal reference price of the brand. Other studies find that price deals 
lead to lower quality perceptions (e.g., Blattberg and Neslin 1990; Dodson, Tybout, and Sternthal 
1978; Rao and Monroe 1988). Angel and Manuel (2005) also find that price deals are negatively 
correlated with perceived brand quality and image. Winer (1986) argues that lowering prices, for 
example, through price deals, can place brands in danger because that creates confusion among 
consumers and that the instability and variability of prices produce a perception of unstable 
brand quality.  
 On the contrary, the level of price is found to positively affect behavioral intentions 
mainly because price establishes image of the brand in the eyes of the consumers (Aaker 1991; 
Yoo, Donthu, and Lee 2000; Rao and Monroe 1989). In a consumer’s heuristics, a high (low) 
price connotes a high (low) quality and image. For a conceptual convenience, this study 
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identifies two types of products by price: high-priced brands and low-priced brands. High-priced 
brands are brands on the market whose image is seen as the key factor. Consumers of these 
brands often purchase them mainly for image and are willing to pay a premium price for their 
perceived high quality and status, which make them price-inelastic (Bolton 1989; Fok et al. 
2006). Low-priced brands tend to be purchased for utilitarian value, with the consumer relying 
on the perceived value for price. Consumers would typically look for low prices of these brands 
or substitutes to get the best value. Low-image brands tend to be more price elastic, as the 
driving factor for their purchase is seen in value by consumers. Table 1 summarizes the findings 
from selected literature related to the effect of price deals and price. 
************************** 
Put Table 1 about here 
************************** 
The Interaction between Price Deals and Price 
 Literature shows that price has a positive impact on behavioral intentions while price 
deals have a negative impact. One question arises: How will the positive effect of price interact 
with the negative effect of price deals? As noted earlier, however, there has been little research 
that examined the interactive effect of price deals and price on behavioral intentions. Therefore, 
it will be interesting to learn how the interaction would behave. If the interaction exists, the main 
effect of either price or price deal would be very weak because the effect of one of them would 
depend on the other. As shown in Table 1, not a small number of studies found any main effect 
for either price or price deal. Such insignificant effects provide a ground to pay attention to the 
existence of the interactive effect. 
 Ratneshwar et al. (2001) argue that personal purchase goals can have a strong influence 
on how consumers categorize and compare products. It should be noted that consumers buy 
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high-priced brands (typically luxury goods), driven by either social-adjunctive attitudes that seek 
design, image, or social status or value-expression attitudes that seek product durability or 
quality (Wilcox et al. 2009). On the contrary, consumers buy low-priced brands mainly for 
transaction value, that is, how much they obtain for the price they pay. Therefore, behavioral 
intentions would depend on the consumer purchase goal. When the goal can be satisfied, 
consumers will buy the brand, become loyal to the brand, and feel more value by the brand 
name. If the purchase goal cannot be satisfied, consumers are likely to buy or switch to another 
brand that would satisfy their purchase goal. But the goal is not uniform across brands. It must be 
different between high- and low-priced brands. Consumers will seek value for low-priced brands, 
whereas they will seek quality or status for high-priced brands. Therefore, with price deals 
offered, consumers will be momentarily attracted to the increased value for low-priced brands by 
the higher transaction utility (Yoo et al. 2000). However, price deals would lower the perception 
on quality and status especially for high-priced brands (Grewal et al. 1998). Fok et al. (2006) 
also find that brands with relatively frequent price deals are often considered of lower quality 
than similar, rarely promoted brands.  
 Conspicuousness (willingness to spend a great amount of money to demonstrate their 
social status) also plays an important role on brand purchases. Wilcox et al. (2009) find that 
high-priced brands are highly related to consumer conspicuousness. When price deals lower the 
final price they pay, conspicuousness will be damaged, which makes consumers unhappy. 
Similarly, consumers pursue exclusivity (they want to be the only buyers who belong to the elite 
society) from high-priced brands. Price deals will unfortunately decrease exclusivity, which 
lowers the attractiveness of high-priced brands. In contrast, low-priced brand buyers are not 
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concerned with conspicuousness or exclusivity desires. Instead, they would be pleased with the 
increased value garnered by the price deals.  
 In summary, the consumer’s goals for high-priced brands and low-priced brands are 
completely different. Thus, consumers looking for quality, status, self expression, and image will 
gravitate toward high-priced brands to fulfill their goals, the achievement of which can be 
signaled through promotional messages of conspicuousness and exclusivity. But the consumers 
looking for price value will be attracted to low-priced brands to satisfy their goals. Price deals 
can work positively or negatively for the purchase goals. Specifically, price deals are expected to 
have a positive effect on low-priced brands because they provide transaction value, the major 
purchase goal towards low-priced brands. On the contrary, they are likely to have a negative 
effect on high-priced brands because they do not serve, but rather damage, quality and status 
perceptions, the major purchase goal toward high-priced brands. 
 Therefore, we hypothesize as follows: 
H1: Price deals decrease consumers’ behavioral intentions toward a high-priced brand. 
H2: Price deals increase consumers’ behavioral intentions toward a low-priced brand. 
In this study, behavioral intentions were represented by brand equity, brand loyalty, and 
purchase intention. These specific measures were selected for three reasons. First, among many 
other marketing activities, price and price deal are found to particularly affect actual product 
purchases. From this understanding, it would be ideal to measure consumers’ behavioral 
intentions toward the brand rather than cognition or attitudes. Second, they can be interpreted as 
a proxy measure of sales and financial success in the market. Third, in particular, brand equity 
and loyalty belong to the group of the best marketing performance metrics (Yoo, Donthu, and 




Experimental Design  
The purpose of this study was to test the interactive effect of price deals and price. 
Specifically, we wanted to measure how behavioral intentions are affected for a high-priced 
brand and a low-priced brand when the price deal is offered. To test the research hypotheses, we 
created a two (price level: high versus low; between) by two (price deal: absent versus 40% off; 
between) experimental design, under which we conducted two studies: Study 1 involved two real, 
existing brands and Study 2 created a fictitious brand. Study 1 aimed at obtaining high external 
validity, whereas Study 2 was expected to guarantee high internal validity.  
Study 1 
We selected a Prada handbag as a high-priced brand and a Mossimo handbag as a low-
priced brand. These two brands, available in stores, showed a significantly different price level to 
each other. Price deals had two categories: absent versus 40% off. We felt that 40% off would  
represent a price deal because retailers offer 40% price deals on average for handbag brands 
(Klonick 2008). We chose handbags for women because the gender we surveyed (female) was 
well aware of the product category. We conducted a pilot study to examine female consumers’ 
use of handbags, awareness of the brands available in the market, and their involvement with the 
product. We felt that a handbag would be a good fit for the survey based on its involvement, 
usage, and brand awareness levels.  
 Each survey of the two-by-two scenarios was presented to participants in a print 
advertisement format. Each ad, shown in a letter-size paper, consisted of the logo, the photo, the 
copy message, and a price deal amount for the focal brand. The font size for the ad copy and the 
photo size of each brand remained the same, and the copy on the ads was carefully modified 
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from the original ads so as to give a realistic and professional sense to participants. Two 
examples of the ads are shown in Appendix 1. 
Procedure 
Because the product was a female handbag, we decided to ask female college students to 
participate. A total of 80 college female students taking undergraduate- or graduate-level 
business classes voluntarily participated for a minimal extra credit. Their age ranged from 19 to 
42, with an average of 23.40 and standard deviation of 3.94. Their working hours per week 
ranged from 0 to 55, with an average of 20.08 and standard deviation of 14.39. Participants 
showed no significant difference in purchase experiences between Prada and Mossimo (chi-
square = 1.25, df=1, p = 0.26). The four versions of the survey were randomly assigned to 
participants. Each survey consisted of four pages: a brief description of the study and a stimulus 
ad on the first page, manipulation checking questions and effect measures on the second and 
third pages, and demographic measures on the last page. Participants were requested to respond 
to every question of the survey. The ad was shown in a smaller scale as a reminder on the top of 
the second and third pages. Through this procedure, we collected twenty responses per survey 
version. The price perception, when measured by one question, “The final price of the above 
brand is high,” was used to check the manipulations. It was significantly different for the price 
manipulation: Prada (M = 5.72) versus Mossimo (M = 3.50) (t = 5.80, df=78, p < 0.0001) and for 
the price deal manipulation: no deal (M = 4.90) versus 40% off (M = 4.32) (t = 1.27, df=78, p < 
0.10).  
Measures 
 As the effect of two independent variables (the level of price and the level of price deal), 
behavioral intentions were measured threefold: brand equity, brand loyalty, and purchase 
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intention. Brand equity is defined as “the difference in consumer choice between the focal 
branded product and the unbranded product, given the same level of product features” (Yoo et al. 
2000). Brand loyalty is defined as “a deeply held commitment to rebuy or repatronize a preferred 
product or service consistently in the future, despite situational influences and marketing efforts 
having the potential to cause switching behavior” (Oliver 1997). Like purchase intention that is a 
popular and direct indicator of actual purchase of the future, both brand equity and brand loyalty 
are concerned with brand choice behaviors showing the extent to which a consumer shows 
favorable responses to the focal brand (Chaudhuri and Holbrook 2001; Grover and Srinivasan 
1992). Therefore, these three outcomes were deemed appropriate as performance measures of 
price and price deal stimuli.  
The measures of the three types of effect were adopted from Yoo et al. (2000) and 
anchored on 1 = strongly disagree and 7 = strongly agree. The detailed measure items are 
reported in Appendix 2. Brand equity, measured by four items, showed reliability of 0.93. Brand 
loyalty, measured by three items, earned reliability of 0.87. And purchase intention, measured by 
three items, showed reliability of 0.96. We also measured product involvement (reliability of 
0.87) by adopting four items from Zaichkowsky’s (1994) scale, which allowed a participant to 
express how important and relevant to her the handbag is. Product involvement was included in 
analysis for the purpose of controlling participants’ product experiences and knowledge levels 
and estimating the pure effect of the independent variables. Product involvement is known to 
affect consumer purchase activities, representing the perceived relevance of the product category 
to the individual consumer (Quester and Lim 2003; Slama and Tashchian 1985). Richins and 
Bolch (1986) observe that consumers with high product involvement find the product interesting 
and occupy the consumer’s thoughts. Quester and Lim (2003) insist that this interest in the 
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product category may arise from the consumer’s perception that the product class meets 
important values and goals. Thus, product involvement must be identified and controlled in 
evaluating the behavioral intentions for both high-priced and low-priced brands. 
Result 
Multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) was conducted to test the effect of two 
independent variables (price and price deal) and their interaction, taking product involvement as 
a covariate, on three dependent variables (purchase intention, brand loyalty, and brand equity). 
For the factorial design, the multivariate test for the assumption of homoscedasticity was 
insignificant (Box’s M = 18.40, p = 0.52), failing to reject the null hypothesis of homogeneity of 
variance-covariance matrices. In the Levene’s univariate test for each dependent variable, brand 
loyalty and purchase intention showed an insignificant result (p > 0.10), confirming 
homoscedasticity, but as for brand equity, the significance level was 0.05, indicating possible 
heteroscedasticity.  
 The multivariate test results by MANCOVA clearly showed no main effect of either price 
(p = 0.92) or price deal (p = 0.25), but a significant interactive effect (p < 0.05), supporting the 
research hypothesis that the effect of price deals depends on the price level of a focal brand. 
Figure 1 visually shows the interaction effect between price and price deal on three behavioral 
intention variables. The interaction was a classic case as represented by the X-shaped crossed 
lines. In other words, the effect of price deal was reversed at two different levels of price. For the 
low-priced brand, Mossimo, presence of price deal was much more favorable than was absence 
of it by increasing each behavioral intention index. On the other hand, for the high-priced brand, 
Prada, absence of price deal was more favorable than was presence of it. Therefore, the effect of 
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price deal depends on at what level the brand is priced, which supports H1 and H2 at the overall 
behavioral intention level. 
******************************* 
Figure 1 about here 
******************************* 
 As there was a strong interaction effect, the main effect of price deal was invalid, which 
means that it is not possible to expect similar price deal effects across brands, which was also not 
found in Gupta’s (1988) study. Because of the significant interaction effect, univariate tests 
(ANCOVA) were conducted to examine the combined impact of price and price deal on the 
individual dependent variables. As shown in Table 2, it turned out that there was a strong 
interaction effect between price and price deal in every dependent variable: brand equity (F = 
6.36, p < 0.01), brand loyalty (F = 6.33, p < 0.01), and purchase intention (F = 7.51, p < 0.01). 
This result supports H1 and H2 at the individual behavioral intention level. The effect size of the 
interaction was 0.08 for both brand equity and loyalty and 0.09 for purchase intention, as shown 
by η2. However, neither price nor price deal, whose p-value was higher than 0.30, had a 
significant main effect on any dependent variable. It is noteworthy that product involvement 
showed a significant effect for brand equity (p < 0.10) and brand loyalty (p < 0.05). 
************************** 
Put Table 2 about here 
************************** 
Study 2 
Using real brands, Study 1 clearly showed that with a low price brand the price 
promotion had favorable effects on behavioral intentions, whereas with a high-priced brand it 
had unfavorable effects. Despite such impressive findings, however, Study 1 cannot be free from 
criticism. Specifically, in Study 1, in an effort to increase the realism by using existing brands, 
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price was tied to the brand name and the ad content. Therefore, the effect of price could have 
been confounded with that of brand name and/or ad content. As a result, the very question, 
“Does price level interact with the presence versus absence of a price promotion?” was not 
answered yet in a sense. That was why Study 2 was designed. In Study 2, two factors only, price 
and price deal, were manipulated without changing anything else. In particular, to remove 
preexisting perceptions on any brand, we created a fictitious brand and a fairly neutral ad content 
such that the brand could be viewed as either a low- or a high-priced alternative. Both low- and 
high-priced products had the same brand name, called BSM, and the same model name, Unisex 
G316W Sunglasses, both of which were fictitious. We selected unisex sunglasses to be able to 
study both gender types. Two specific price levels ($24.95 as low and $274.95 as high) were 
selected because they represented the 90th and 10th percentile of the market prices, respectively, 
among about 36,000 sunglasses models. As in Study 1, we hired the same two levels of price 
deal: absent versus 40% off. We took 40% off as a price deal because that was the most popular 
price deal for sunglasses. We clearly informed participants of the regular prices in all 4 
conditions: (1) high price/no discount; (2) high price/discount; (3) low price/no discount; (4) low 
price/discount. Then, the reduced price was shown within the two discount conditions. Appendix 
3 exhibits two of the four ads conveying the experimental design.     
Procedure 
Four versions of the survey (2 levels of price, between, x 2 levels of price deal, between) 
were developed in the same manner and structure reported for Study 1. The surveys were 
randomly assigned to participants, each of whom was exposed to one version only. A total of 119 
undergraduate and graduate business students (60 females and 59 males) voluntarily participated 
in Study 2 for a minimal extra credit. They were 28.97 years old on average. They owned one to 
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four pairs of sunglasses (2.13 on average). Across four versions of the survey, participants 
showed no significant difference in age (F = 0.15, p = 0.93), the number of owned pairs of 
sunglasses (F = 1.29, p = 0.28), the price that they were willing to pay if they would buy a pair of 
sunglasses (F = 0.99, p = 0.40), product involvement with sunglasses (F = 0.36, p = 0.79), and 
gender (chi-square = 0.59, df=1, p = 0.90).  
To check the manipulation, we developed a three-item scale of perceived price and a 
three-item scale of perceived price deal in a 7-point scale: reliability was 0.95 and 0.86, 
respectively (see the scales in Appendix 2). Price perception was significantly different between 
low (M = 2.23) versus high (M = 6.34) price scenarios (t = 24.95, df=117, p < 0.0001), and price 
deal perception was also significantly different between no deal (M = 2.94) versus 40% off (M = 
5.16) scenarios (t = 13.79, df=117, p < 0.0001). As in Study 1, the effect of two independent 
variables (price and price deal) was measured in three types of behavioral intentions. The items 
were measured in a 7-point scale (1 = Strongly Disagree and 7 = Strongly Agree) and reliability 
was highly satisfactory: 0.88 for brand equity, 0.81 for brand loyalty, and 0.95 for purchase 
intention. Factor analysis of the items of the three measures produced a clear three-factor 
structure, which explained 81.5% of total variances: 28.7% for brand equity, 27.0% for purchase 
intention, and 25.8% for brand loyalty.  
Result 
Four groups (two levels of price x two levels of price deal) had a statistically equivalent 
sample size to one another, ranging from 26 to 36 (chi-square = 2.04, df=3, p = 0.56). The result 
of MANCOVA was conducted to simultaneously test the effect of price and price deal and their 
interaction, taking product involvement as a covariate, on three dependent variables (purchase 
intention, brand loyalty, and brand equity). Unlike in Study 1, the main effect of both price (p < 
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0.05) and price deal (p < 0.01) was significant. Nevertheless, the interaction effect of price and 
price deal was also significant at the 0.10 level, which warrants the investigation of univariate 
tests at each dependent variable level. Table 3 reports the results of ANCOVA, which identified 
a significant interaction effect between price and price deal in brand equity (F = 3.50, p < 0.05) 
and brand loyalty (F = 3.00, p < 0.01), while having no significant main effect of either price or 
price deal on these two dependent variables. Figure 2 exhibits the same X-shaped interaction 
effects as found in Study 1. However, the interaction was directionally supported for purchase 
intention (F = 1.26, p = 0.17), although its shape was also cross-over as shown in Figure 2c. 
Therefore, H1 and H2 were clearly supported for two dependent variables (brand equity and 
loyalty) but directionally supported for the third variable (purchase intention). The effect size of 
the interaction was 0.03 for brand equity and 0.05 for brand loyalty, but just 0.01 for purchase 
intention. As found in Study 1, however, according to ANCOVA, neither price nor price deal (p 
> 0.10) showed a significant main effect in any dependent variable in Study 2. This indicates that 
the effect of price deal is opposite, depending on the price level of the brand. For the low-priced 
brand, presence of price deal increased behavioral intentions more than the absence of it. On the 
other hand, for the high-priced brand, absence of price deal increased the behavioral intentions 
than the presence of it. In conclusion, the effect of price deal depends on the level at which the 
brand is priced. It was significant for brand equity and loyalty, but directional for purchase 
intention. Study 1 and Study 2 together confirm that the effect of price deal depends on the level 
of the original price and that price deal should be encouraged for a low-priced product but 
discouraged for a high-priced product.  
************************************* 




CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
 Unlike previous research, this study examined the effect of price deals in the context of 
price level, using an experimental design. Both Study 1 (two existing brands) and Study 2 (a 
fictitious brand) confirmed that price deals do not have a uniform effect across brands but a 
different effect depending on the price level of a brand. Depending on the price level, the 
consumer’s behavioral intentions were quite different when exposed to price deals. Specifically, 
for a high-priced brand, we observed that price deals have a negative effect on brand equity, 
brand loyalty, and purchase intention. On the contrary, for a low-priced brand, we observed a 
positive effect on each of the same behavioral intention variables. This study expands our 
understanding of consumer behavior toward a brand when consumers have to process the 
information of price and price deals simultaneously. We found a significant behavioral 
difference when there a price deal exists in comparison to no-price deal. However, the direction 
of the behavior was reverse depending on the level of price.  
Managerial Implications 
 The findings of this research suggest that marketers have to rethink the promotional 
strategies for their brands. For instance, Ghodeswar (2008) argues that brands evolve over time 
and require a lot of time and resources to construct a brand image and build an identity. So he 
insists that each single promotional message needs to be carefully designed as it can contribute to 
building or destroying the brand. Upshaw (1985) also argues that brand identity hinges on who 
consumers are as individuals, the environment they live in, and the signal sent from the brand 
itself. For instance, high-priced brands (typically, luxury brands) target those who see image as 
their goal of purchase. To impress these consumers, marketers invent a unique promotional 
strategy that shapes the image, which could be the function of uniqueness of the product in the 
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competitive market that tries to defy the image. However, the moment the high-priced brand is 
on sale through price promotions that uniqueness and image can be damaged, and consumers’ 
behavioral intentions diminish because the brand does not satisfy the goal of its target market 
any more. For low-priced brands, the opposite is the case. The goal of the consumer is the pursuit 
of value for the money, which can be much more successful with price deals, consequently 
increasing the behavioral intentions.   
 High-priced brands are seen as image-related goods. They have been successful in 
developing their own unique image, which was a formed through not only physical quality but 
also advertising activities. Prada, for instance, promotes “Hollywood stars use it why not you? 
Be noticed, Be admired.” This message clearly satisfies the goal of consumers, which is to 
possess image and status. Thus, consumers make a purchase. However, the very moment there is 
a price deal offered on Prada, even with the same advertisement text, the behavioral intentions 
become weakened. The price deal clearly obstructs the consumer’s purchase goal of image, 
decreasing the purchase intension along with brand equity and brand loyalty, because it sends 
negative vibes toward high-priced image brands. On the contrary, low-priced brands are seen to 
serve functional goals. Their consumers are price-sensitive and typically go for value. A lower-
price tag, thanks to a price deal, justifies their purchase. Therefore, the implication of the 
findings is obvious that high-priced brands should avoid price deals, whereas low-priced brands 
could benefit from price deals. 
 We admit that our study does not provide enough detailed insights into many related 
issues such as whether price deals should be completely stopped for high-priced brands, whether 
occasional price deals can be acceptable for high-priced brands, what dollar-amount price level is 
objectively or subjectively high enough in defining high-priced brands, and what percent or 
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dollar-amount price deal can make a difference in each of the high- and low-priced brands. 
Nevertheless, it seems to be a reasonable conclusion that price deals should be avoided, if 
possible, if image and status, rather than value or functionality, is a primary positioning of the 
brand. On the contrary, price deals can be relatively freely used for a brand which pursues 
competition based on value for money or functionality.     
Limitations and Future Research 
 Overcoming the weaknesses of the study would be the directions of future research. First, 
our experimental design could be stronger. Specifically, we selected a 40% sale to measure the 
effect of a price deal. Although the discount rate was derived from the industry’s common 
practice, it could strengthen the confidence in the findings if a range of various rates is examined. 
Likewise, we relied on two product categories (handbag and sunglasses) and one type of sample 
(undergraduate and graduate business students). Future research needs to study different types of 
products and samples to enhance the external validity of the findings. 
 Second, our sample consist of consumers of the US, but the reaction to price and price 
deals might vary across nations as the same marketing strategy is often received differently in 
different countries. Likewise, individuals’ personal cultural tendencies might show similar 
differences in evaluating marketing stimuli. For instance, Yoo (2009) found collectivism has a 
significant effect on brand loyalty and equity. In his study, regardless of the national identity, 
collectivist individuals showed higher brand loyalty and equity across brands than did 
individualist individuals. Therefore, whether the findings of our study are consistent across 
national cultures or individual-level cultural tendencies needs to be examined. Along with this 
line, the role of sociodemographics (e.g., personal income, marital status, employment status, 
and education level) and psychological characteristics (e.g., perceived social class, vanity, 
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materialism, life style, and self-esteem) needs to be studied in processing price and price deal 
combinations. 
 Third, the study was based on experiments. Although an experiment is a reliable method 
to test causality, it lacks reality. Thus, future research needs to examine real market data that 
have recorded price changes and price deal offerings at the brand level across product categories 
over many time periods. Related to this, when studying real data, competition needs to be 
included because the interactive effect of price and price deals must be different depending on 
how competing brands act and react.    
 Fourth, in investigating the interactive effect of price and price deal, this study observed 
behavioral intentions as dependent variables. However, future research needs to also pay 
attention to mediating variables to show more details of the procedural mechanism of how price 
interacts with price deal. Then researchers and marketers could discover strategic insights into 
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Selected Literature Review on the Effect of Price and Price Deals 
 
Dependent Variable  Effect a Sources 
 
Effect of Price on: 
 Brand choice Positive Lemon et al. (2002) 
 Brand equity Positive Aaker (1991); Yoo et al. (2000) 
 Brand loyalty Positive Yoo et al. (2000) 
 Likelihood of permanent price reduction Positive Chen et al. (1998) 
 Likelihood of regular price inflation Positive Chen et al. (1998) 
 Perceived quality Positive  Grewal et al. (1998); Rao and Monroe (1989); Yoo et al. (2000) 
 Significance of savings Positive Chen et al. (1998) 
 Brand choice Negative Jedidi et al. (1999) 
 Promotional price elasticity  Negative  Karande and Kumar (1995) 
 Quantity Negative Jedidi et al. (1999) 
 Perceived quality Mixed  Bolton (1989); Fok et al. (2006); Wilcox et al. (2009) 
 Perceived discount n.s.b  Gupta and Cooper (1992) 
 Promotional cross-price elasticity  n.s. Karande and Kumar (1995) 
 Purchase intention n.s. Chen et al. (1998) 
 Purchase intention change n.s.  Gupta and Cooper (1992) 
 
 
Effect of Price Deal on: 
 Brand choice Positive Jedidi et al. (1999) 
 Forward buying Positive  Helsen and Schmittlein (1992) 
 Immediate effect Positive Fok et al. (2006) 
 Likelihood of permanent price reduction Positive Chen et al. (1998) 
 Likelihood of regular price inflation Positive Chen et al. (1998) 
 Long-term effect Positive  Fok et al. (2006) 
 Number of transactions Positive  Lam et al. (2001) 
 Perceived price  Positive  Sheng et al. (2007) 
 Perceived value  Positive Grewal et al. (1998) 
 Purchase intention Positive Chen et al. (1998) 
 Store traffic Positive  Lam et al. (2001) 
 Brand equity Negative Yoo et al. (2000) 
 Brand loyalty Negative Yoo et al. (2000) 
 Effort to find promotion Negative  Campo and Yagüe (2008) 
 Estimates of average brand prices Negative  Alba et al. (1999) 
 Internal reference price  Negative  Grewal et al. (1998) 
 Loyalty to tour operator Negative  Campo and Yagüe (2008) 
 Perceived monetary price Negative  Campo and Yagüe (2008) 
 Perceived quality Negative  Angel and Manuel (2005); Blattberg and Neslin (1990); Dodson 
et al. (1978); Fok et al (2006); Rao and Monroe (1988); Sheng et 
al. (2007);Winer (1986) Yoo et al. (2000) 
 Store sales  Mixed  Lam et al. (2001) 
 Front traffic n.s. Lam et al. (2001) 
 Long-run effect n.s. Nijs et al. (2001) 
 Perceived quality n.s. Grewal et al. (1998) 
 Quantity of purchase n.s. Jedidi et al. (1999) 
 Satisfaction  n.s.  Campo and Yagüe (2008) 
 Short-run effect n.s. Nijs et al. (2001)  
 Significance of savings n.s. Chen et al. (1998) 
 




Study 1. Univariate Tests for Group Differences in Dependent Variables 
 




Square F p-value 
Product  
Involvement 
Brand Equity 7.92 1 7.92 2.98 0.09 
Brand Loyalty 10.76 1 10.76 4.18 0.04 
Purchase Intention 3.77 1 3.77 1.18 0.28 
Price Brand Equity 0.00 1 0.00 0.00 0.98 
Brand Loyalty 0.27 1 0.27 0.10 0.75 
Purchase Intention 0.35 1 0.35 0.11 0.74 
Price Deal Brand Equity 2.95 1 2.95 1.11 0.30 
Brand Loyalty 0.26 1 0.26 0.10 0.75 
Purchase Intention 0.42 1 0.42 0.13 0.72 
Price x Price Deal Brand Equity 16.92 1 16.92 6.36 0.01 
Brand Loyalty 16.30 1 16.30 6.33 0.01 






Study 2. Univariate Tests for Group Differences in Dependent Variables 
 




Square F p-value 
Product  
Involvement 
Brand Equity 1.56 1 1.56 2.03 0.15 
Brand Loyalty 1.18 1 1.18 2.70 0.10 
Purchase Intention 0.27 1 0.27 0.40 0.52 
Price Brand Equity 1.46 1 1.46 1.90 0.17 
Brand Loyalty 0.58 1 0.58 1.31 0.25 
Purchase Intention 0.01 1 0.01 0.01 0.89 
Price Deal Brand Equity 1.48 1 1.48 1.93 0.16 
Brand Loyalty 1.14 1 1.14 2.59 0.11 
Purchase Intention 0.38 1 0.38 0.56 0.45 
Price x Price Deal Brand Equity 3.50 1 3.50 4.54 0.03 
Brand Loyalty 3.00 1 3.00 6.82 0.01 












Study 1. Graphical Presentations of Interaction Effect between Price and Price Deals 
 
1a. Effect on Brand Equity 
 
1b. Effect on Brand Loyalty 
 

















Study 2. Graphical Presentations of Interaction Effect between Price and Price Deals 
 
2a. Effect on Brand Equity 
 
2b. Effect on Brand Loyalty 
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Appendix 2. Measures of Constructs 
 
 
Perceived price (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.95b)  
• The final price (the actual price you should pay) is expensive.  
• The final price is cheap. (reverse) 
• The final price is high.  
 
Perceived price deal (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.86b)  
• XYZ is on great sale. 
• The final price of XYZ is now much cheaper than the regular price. 
• The final price makes me save a lot, compared to the regular price.  
 
Brand equity (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.93a and 0.88b)  
• It makes sense to by XYZ instead of any other brand, even if they are the same.  
• Even if other brand has same features as XYZ, I would prefer to buy XYZ.  
• If there is another brand as good as XYZ, I prefer to buy XYZ. 
• If another brand is not different from XYZ in any way, it seems smarter to purchase XYZ.  
 
Brand loyalty (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.87a and 0.81b)  
• I consider myself loyal to XYZ.  
• XYZ would be my first choice. 
• I will not buy any other brand ABC if XYZ is available in the store.  
 
Purchase intention (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.96 a and 0.95b)  
• I will definitely purchase XYZ in the near future. 
• I intend to purchase XYZ in the near future. 
• It is likely that I will purchase XYZ in the near future. 
 
Product involvement (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.87 a and 0.87b)  
To me, ABC is: 
• Unimportant  __ __ __ __ __ __ __  Important  
• Irrelevant   __ __ __ __ __ __ __  Relevant 
• Means nothing  __ __ __ __ __ __ __ Means a lot  
• Worthless   __ __ __ __ __ __ __  Valuable 
 
XYZ and ABC denote the focal brand and the product category, respectively; a Measured in Study 1; and b 




Appendix 3. Experimental Stimuli for Study 2 (Two Examples) 
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